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ABSTRACT 
This essay explores the "unconscious" meaning of the 
metaphors in which psychoanalytic theory is stated. In other 
words, the psychoanalytic method of interpretation is turned 
back on the theory itself. Considered are Freud's theories of 
sexuality, pleasure-unpleasure, masculinity-femininity and the 
metapsychology. The roots of these theories are located in Freud's 
intellectual "childhood" in a nineteenth"",century system of values 
and traced from that source through major portions of his later 
work. 
SOME METAPHORICAL TYPES 
MET WITH IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORyl 
Louis Breger 
I. MIND AS METAPHOR 
The human mind can be represented in many ways. We imagine it 
as a place behind our eyes, hear it as an internal voice, talking 
silently to ourselves, picture it with the visual images of dreams and 
fantasies, and feel and sense it in other ways. We speak of 
psychological experience as occurring in "the mind" though "it" is 
certainly not a thing. Common usage employs all these metaphors of 
locating, picturing and hearing, derived from the various sense 
modalities. Psychologists and psychoanalysts rely on many of these 
same metaphors and use, in addition, symbols and analogies from other 
fields. The mind is described as a machine, a steam engine or 
telephone switchboard in the past or a computer, processing 
information, today. Biological analogies are employed: the mind as a 
"creature" that takes in nourishment in the form of stimuli and 
digests, assimilates or incorporates it. Still another biological 
metapho~ is taken from the theory of evolution and embryology: mind 
as developing "organism" moving through stages of increasing 
complex~ty and organization. And then there are physical and 
architectural images, mental "structures", "levels" of thought, 
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"upper" and "lower" regions. 
The mind and its qualities--psychological experience in the 
broad sense--is only known, and certainly can only be talked about, 
with some set of metaphors; we cannot get at "it" except with some 
form of symbolic representation. It is essential to note that 
psychological experience is inseparable from the system of metaphors 
with which it is represented. Many ways of representing such 
experience are possible and each has its appeal, its usefulness, its 
advantages and limitations. Metaphors of the mind are both creative 
and determining, expansive and constricting, conscious and 
unconscious, for as we open possibilities with a new form of 
representation we inevitably close off others. 
The many metaphors that Freud uses in psychoanalytic theory 
have been noted by different commentators and continue to be the 
subject of debate. Sometimes he locates the mind in physical space, 
consciousness is "above" and the unconscious "below", with a "barrier" 
of repression in between. An early model represents the perceptual 
apparatus as a sort of camera with a filing cabinet behind, "it" 
records perceptions of reality which are then stored in the file of 
memory from which they may later be retrieved. Or consciousness is a 
"searchlight" focused on a small part of the unconscious. One of the 
best known metaphorical systems is that blend of hydrodynamics, 
electricity, sex and emotion: libido theory, with its "forces," 
"excitations," and "energy" flowing into "objects" or collateral 
channels. And then there are the well known metaphors with human 
actors: the id, the ego and the superego. Later versions of these 
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anthropomorphic images postulate different representations of early 
relationships: "inner" fathers and mothers, "introjects" and 
"internal objects." 
As he created and developed psychoanalytic theory over the 
years Freud used a variety of metaphors to represent psychological 
experience. It is typical of his style as a theorist that images and 
metaphors from different fields are mixed together. This is 
particularly true of the theories of motivation which are stated in 
several overlapping languages: the force and energy metaphors of 
libido theory; the drive-tension-release of the pleasure principle; 
the many versions of instinct; sexuality, aggression, ego instincts, 
life, Eros and death. In addition, these different languages are 
blended and terms such as energy. pleasure, tension or death used in 
both a technical-theoretical and an everyday sense. Often Freud is 
aware of the metaphorical, speculative and tentative character of his 
theoretical constructions, though sometimes he seems not to be. And 
there is nothing inherently unscientific, irrational or unconscious 
about theory stated in this form, indeed as I have stressed, the mind 
can only be represented metaphorically. But, while many ways of 
representing psychological experience are possible, once theory 
becomes tied to a particular metaphorical system, it may become 
trapped in the images, assumptions and values of that system. To take 
a widely known example: metaphors of the mind as a machine, and this 
includes a fancy modern machine like a computer, may be useful in work 
that relates, say, memory or perception to neurophysiology. But such 
models may prove inadequate, if not dangerously misleading, in dealing 
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with more complex human actions and intentions. Some of Freud's 
quasi-mechanical metaphors have been troublesome in just this way. 
While many of the metaphors of psychoanalytic theory represent 
the creative search for new forms of representation, some of them have 
also come to serve as repositories of old assumptions and values. And 
there are aspects of the theory that can only be understood as 
unconscious, that carry a burden of repressed meaning from the past. 
II. CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS METAPHORS 
In Some Character Types Met With in Psychoanalytic Work, the 
essay whose title I paraphrase here, Freud explains the behavior of 
three "types": "the exceptions," "those wrecked by success," and 
"criminals from a sense of guilt." In each case, what seems like a 
senseless or self-defeating adult action is shown to be the 
unconscious reenactment of a pattern carried over from childhood. 
Consciously committing a crime for gain, a criminal makes foolish 
mistakes which betray his unconscious wish to be punished. The whole 
,drama of crime, capture and punishment can be, as Freud shows, a 
reenactment of a script written in the past. This is the model that 
Freud employs to explain a great range of phenomena: neurotic 
symptoms, character problems of many kinds, the latent meaning of 
dreams, slips, errors and the mistakes of everyday life. All involve 
the symbolic or metaphorical expression of conflict that the person is 
not aware of. 
But what, more precisely, does it mean to call these forms oJ: 
expression unconscious? In the main line of psychoanalysis this has, 
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for the most part, meant that they are like neurotic symptoms. 
Freud's discoveries of the many ways in which conflicts are 
unconsciously expressed occurred in a particular historical order that 
shaped the way these insights were later used. The discovery of the 
unconscious meaning of neurotic symptoms came first and assumed a 
special significance as defining model for the forms of interpretation 
that followed. Dreams-_hich Freud once called "little defense 
neuropsychoses"--jokes, slips of the tongue and, later, works of 
fiction, drama and art, were all interpreted within the framework 
first developed to decode symptoms. Unfortunately, in the enthusiasm 
to extend the insights about the unconscious, to decode symbols of all 
sorts, important differences were sometimes blurred or lost. A dream 
is not a symptom nor is a novel or playa neurosis, though one can use 
insights from the study of neuroses to illuminate such creative works. 
The failure to note differences has led many psychoanalysts to speak 
as if it were symbolism, metaphor, fantasy, disguise or primary 
process thinking themselves that are pathological rather than the 
particular uses to which these forms of expression are sometimes put. 
In other words, we must distinguish between non-neurotic and neurotic 
forms of symbolic expression, between what I am calling conscious and 
unconscious metaphors. 
Let me approach this distinction with a simple example. If I 
say that my mother-in-law is "a pain-in-the-neck" I am using a common 
metaphor to show my dislike, my anger or to comment on the trouble she 
causes me. If someone asks me if she really makes my neck hurt, I say 
no, that's just a figure of speech. I can, with ease, distinguish the 
6 
literal from the metaphorical level and, when I do so, step outside my 
own discourse and comment on it. I am aware--conscious--or can easily 
become aware, of the feelings expressed by the metaphor. Now, imagine 
a young woman, trapped in an intensely ambivalent relationship with 
her mother, with a great need for love and much frustration and rage 
who is unable to express these feelings directly for fear of losing 
the very person whose care she needs most. She develops a severe pain 
in her neck, is taken to doctors and specialists, where it is 
eventually diagnosed as "emotional," or a "psychiatric problem." To 
her, of course, the pain is only too real; it hurts, disrupts her 
life, its origin and cause are a mystery, calling it emotional or 
psychiatric gives no relief. If the young woman of our example were 
able to enter therapy or psychoanalysis it might eventually be 
revealed how her symptom--(like Anna O's paralyzed arm or Dora's 
cough) was a metaphorical expression for the complex emotional 
relationship with her mother, that it expressed the "pain" of her 
rejection, was a way of communicating her anger at mother-"you see 
how you make me feel and none of your doctors or ministrations are of 
any helpl"--while simultaneously expressing guilt and self-punishment. 
The pain-in-the-neck of the young woman, in contrast to that of my 
figure of speech, fulfills all the criteria of a neurotic symptom as 
,unconscious metaphor. 
Using these two "pains-in-the-neck" as examples, it is 
possible to state the criteria that define an unconscious metaphor. 
First, the young woman's symptom is quite simply not conscious; she is 
unaware of the meanings expressed by her pain; the metaphor is 
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experienced literally, is unrecognized as a metaphor, and attempts to 
interpret its meaning meet with incomprehension amd resistance. We 
might say that her pain disguises and hides as it communicates while 
the figure of speech simply expresses meaning in a creative form. 
These two ways of communicating are related to the distinction that 
Freud noted long ago between preconscious and unconscious, between the 
metaphor whose meaning is easily recognized and accepted and that 
which is s,trongly resistant to interpretation. Second, because the 
young woman is trapped at the level of literally experienced metaphor, 
she cannot get outside her immediate frame of reference, cannot see 
herself and her situation in more than one way. Just as she cannot 
comment on her ambivalent relationship with her mother, so she cannot 
take the point of view of an observer in regard to her symptom. 
Third, since the meanings of the symptom are unconscious, and since 
she cannot get outside a definition of herself in symptomatic terms, 
the disguised conflicts are not modified by further experience. In 
more familiar psychoanalytic terms we say she is fixated, the 
unconscious conflicts are timeless, they are unaffected by later 
reality testing. She cannot, for example, become intimate with 
someone other than her mother, or express anger and find she is not 
overwhelmed with guilt because, in her own view, these are not her 
problems: she suffers from a pain in her neck. Finally, unconscious 
metaphors such as this become determining; symptoms and related 
peurotic character problems come to express major aspects of the 
person's life. The neurotic struggles with them--pains, phobias, 
perverse fantasies, depression--rather than with the interpersonal 
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conflicts that were their antecedents. 
The whole process of the development and maintenance of 
unconscious metaphors, of a neurotic way of life, may be summarized as 
follows: the infant or young child is confronted with interpersonal 
conflicts which arouse painful and threatening emotions: anxiety, 
guilt, depression, frustration and rage, threats to self-esteem. When 
a solution of such conflicts is not possible in reality the child 
turns to unconscious modes of conflict resolution; he develops 
symptoms, retreats into fantasy, acquires inhibitions or the 
forerunners of a particular character style. These unconscious modes 
give symbolic, disguised or metaphorical expression to the conflict 
while providing some protection from the threatening emotions. The 
whole process may continue more or less directly through childhood or 
remain latent until adolescence when adult demands and opportunities-
-for sexual intimacy, assertive independence, the assumption of adult 
roles--reactivate the original conflicts. Once activated, the old 
unconscious solutions are again brought into play; the neurotic 
continues to act as if the sexual, assertive or independent encounters 
of his adult life contain the dangers of childhood. Since the whole 
process is cut off from awareness, the solutions, necessary in 
childhood, are now endlessly repeated, unmodified by the opportunities 
for change of a new reality. When we are able to successfully modify 
'such a pattern in psychoanalytic therapy, the latent or unconscious 
meaning of the neurotic symbols and metaphors are understood in new 
ways, personality development is reopened and more satisfying modes of 
conflict resolution and interpersonal encounter can be achieved. 
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These distinctions between conscious and unconscious metaphors 
draw together well known psychoanalytic ideas. I summarize them here 
so the reader may have them clearly in mind for use in the discussion 
of theory that will follow. 
III. PSYCHOANALYZING PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 
For purposes of discussion, let us group together a set of 
interrelated ideas covering: sex and its many forms of expression, 
major portions of the metapsychology and theory of instincts, libido 
theory and related concepts concerning pleasure-pain, masculiniy-
femininity and activity-passivity. All these ideas continue to be the 
subject of critical discussion and revision. There have been thorough 
analyses of the influence of Freud's nineteenth-century neurological 
assumptions (Amacher, 1965; Holt, 1965, 1976) and proposals to align 
the theory with modern neurology, information and systems theory 
(Rosenblatt and Thickstun, 1977). Bowlby has carried out a major 
reassessment and reformulation of instinct theory (1969, 1973, see 
especially 1973, Appendix II for a discussion of the pre-Darwinian 
character of Freud's conception of instinct,) There are detailed 
critical analyses of Freud's theoretical language and proposals to 
replace it with a language better suited to human actions, intentions 
and experience (Klein, 1976; Schafer, 1976). Feminist critics offer 
valuable analyses of his ideas about women, male and female identity 
and related issues (Miller, 1973; Mitchell, 1974). And the specific 
theories about sexual disturbance and masculinity-femininity have 
received cogent reformulation (Stoller, 1975, 1979). These many lines 
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of criticism and new theory are extremely valuable in delineating 
logical and empirical problems and suggesting new lines of approach. 
Yet something more is needed; the more I read Freud on 
instinct, pleasure, sexuality, Eros and death, the more I am st.ruck by 
the way the metaphors of these theories are both creative and 
unconscious, how they simultaneously express new theoretical insights 
and indirectly perpetuate old prejudices. Let me discuss just one 
example at this time: the concept of libido. Freud uses libido to 
refer to the sexual energy that drives or motivates a diversity of 
actions, thoughts and fantasies. 2 Crucial to his use as a theoretical 
metaphor is the idea of a reservoir of energy, energy that can assume 
different forms, that can "flow" into many "channels" or, in a related 
use, that can "cathect" different objects, fantasies or parts of the 
person's own body. The metaphor of libido sometimes evokes an image 
of fluid in pipes, channels and dams, at other times electric current 
in neurons, wires and condensors. It is clearly meant to refer to 
experiences of sexual arousal and release, as in orgasm, but also 
refers, more broadly, to the drive-like quality of love, desire and 
related emotions which can "build up," "overflow," or be "released." 
Freud uses the metaphor of a mobile, displaceable, transformable 
energy to tie together and explain a variety of human motives and acts 
that, before his work, appeared unrelated. The somatic symptoms of 
hysteria, the repetitive acts of the compulsive, the choice of 
particular love objects, the obscure images of dreams and the release 
of laughter at a joke are all related to the course followed by a 
fluid sexual energy which assumes different forms as it encounters the 
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"barriers" of reality, repression and conscience. A number of 
contemporary critics have pointed out that the hydraulic and 
electrical metaphors are misleading; they argue that the phenomena in 
question are better described by theories of information processing or 
symbolic transformation. These arguments are well taken, but such 
concepts were not available to Freud in the 1890s. He made creative 
use of images and metaphors borrowed and adapted from the science and 
neurology that he knew. Such use is typical of theory construction in 
many fields and, in itself, does not detract from the usefulness or 
validity of a new theory. And the metaphors of libido do capture 
some, though not all, aspects of some people's sexual and emotional 
experience. 
But there are other ways in which the metaphors of libido 
theory constitute a "return of the repressed," ways in which the very 
sexual prejudices and conflicts that Freud unmasked were 
unintentionally incorporated into his new theories. I will briefly 
note three of these here, fuller documentation will be provided later. 
First is the assumption of an economics of libido, the idea that 
sexual energy, or love, exists in a fixed quantity within the person 
and, if discharged in one way, is unavailable for other purposes. 
There is an obvious sense to this; one only has so much time and 
effort for sex, love or anything else. But the economics of libido 
implies more, it carries over nineteenth-century "moral"-religious 
strictures regarding sexual "saving" and "spending." Second, the 
equation of pain with energy buildup and pleasure with the discharge, 
or even absence, of inner energy is derived from earlier images of the 
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menacing quality of sexual arousal and feeling. And, third, the view 
of the specially pathological quality of "passive libido" was one of 
many ways in which prejudices against women, and qualities associated 
with femininity, were carried forward. In each of these cases, the 
metaphors of libido operate like the unconscious symbols of a 
neurosis; they express conflicts from the past in disguised forms. 
These examples are part of a larger trend within Freud's 
theories of sexuality, instinct, pleasure and masculinity-femininity. 
In all these areas, one finds metaphors that express a return of the 
repressed. Like the neuroses that Freud taught us to understand, this 
unconscious version of theory has its roots in an earlier time of 
life: Freud's intellectual "childhood" in the late nineteenth-
century. Like an unconscious fantasy, again, this side of the theory 
is expressed in metaphors which disguise or obscure its meaning. In 
this disguised form it has been timelessly repeated, little modified 
by contact with the reality of new clinical observations. 
Clearly, what is called for in a case like this is 
psychoanalysis I The various demonstrations of logical and empirical 
problems have shown what is wrong with the theory but it will only be 
"given up" when its underlying motives and purposes are recognized. 
To state this in another way: the psychoanalytic method seeks to 
explore and understand the symbolic world of the patient. I suggest 
that we turn the method back on the theory, that the metaphors of the 
theory can be analyzed in the same way we analyze dreams, symptoms and 
transference reactions. 
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In what follows, I will use the model of psychoanalytic 
interpretation to clarify the unconscious metaphors of its own theory. 
We will begin with an account of the "family background": Freud's 
intellectual "childhood" in the nineteenth-century. The ideas, 
assumptions and values concerning sex, pleasure, emotion, women and 
related topics will be outlined and traced into his early hypotheses 
as we now know them from the Fliess correspondence of the l890s. We 
will then see how these ideas were transformed into an abstract theory 
which, like the metaphorical language of a neurosis, cut them off from 
their roots and from reality testing. Finally, we may entertain some 
speculations as to why this sphere of theory continues to be the 
source of unresolved conflict. 
IV. SEX IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
We owe much of our understanding of "Victorian" sexual 
repression to Freud and it is one of the paradoxes of the present 
analysis that he, who played such a central role in liberating us from 
the sexual prejudice of his time should, in certain of his theories, 
show the lingering effects of this same prejudice. Yet that seems to 
be the case. Let me describe, in a most summary fashion, some 
features of the period. 
Recent historical evidence suggests that European society of 
the past few hundred years has undergone cycles of repressive and 
permissive attitudes toward the treatment of children, the expression 
of emotion, sexuality and related feelings, and the definition of male 
and female roles. 3 The eighteenth-century was, in many ways, a period 
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of relative permissiveness and individualism. Toward the end of that 
period there occurred a revival of "moral reform" characterized by: 
1) the assertion of paternal authority; 2) a repressive orientation 
toward emotional expression, play, and, of course, sexuality; 3) a 
stress on the innate sinfulness of infants and the imposition of harsh 
discipline to control the child's lust, will and other dangerous 
proclivities and; 4) an ambivalent or "split" view of women as, on the 
one hand, largely without passion or sex and, on the other, as overly 
sensual creatures. This interrelated set of values and practices was 
associated with the rising middle class; the nobility, the upper 
classes, the peasants and the poor did not, initially share in them. 
But, of course, as the nineteenth-century progressed it was precisely 
this bourgeois morality that came to prevail. 
Different explanations have been offered for the rise of 
repressive morality. Marx tied it to the ascent of capitalism and the 
exploitation of the proletariat, what Max Weber later called "the 
protestant ethic and the rise of capitalism." Taylor relates the 
recurrence of patrist values to the rise of "the trading middle class" 
and Stone notes the return of Evangelical piety during a period of 
stressful social and political crisis. Foucault (1980) argues that 
sex was not simply repressed but appropriated by the state which 
forced it into new forms of controlling discourse, subjecting it to 
the "endless mill of speech." The specific explanation for the 
prominence of these values need not concern us here, what is clear is 
that historians from a variety of perspectives agree on the main 
features of the period. What, in a bit more detail, was the Victorian 
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moral system? 
The authority of the father within the family was buttressed 
by the belief in a severe male God who kept track of the sinful 
transgressions of his children. As the power and status of fathers 
and men were exalted, those of mothers and women were depreciated. 
Woman's place was in the home, her task to serve men; this was an 
era--as writers in the woman's movement have again called to our 
attention--in which the rights of women were at a low ebb. In 
addition to laws and social practices which restricted the 
opportunities and activities of women there were values which 
stigmatized a set of qualities associated with femininity--emotional 
expressiveness, "softness," playfulness--and glorified qualities 
associated with men--aggression, competition, discipline. Men's 
attitudes toward women and these "feminine" qualities were intensely 
ambivalent. Women were needed and feared, glorified as romantic 
caricatures and sought out in the streets as prostitutes, viewed as 
lacking in passion, sex or emotional power and felt as threatening 
sources of sexual-emotional temptation. 
The moral system was inculcated early in life by practices 
based on the belief that infants contained sinful potentials which had 
to be curbed. Male doctors displaced midwives in the supervision of 
pregnancy and birth and advised mothers on child care. Many beliefs 
and practices interfered with the establishment of a secure mother-
infant bond; infants were given out to wet-nurses and nannies,4 
wrapped in constricting swaddling clothes, plunged in cold baths to 
"toughen" them and subjected to harsh punishment and deprivations 
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meant to stamp out their sexual and willful--that is, autonomous--
potentials. It was not an easy time to be a child; many of the 
recommended practices can only strike the contemporary reader as child 
abuse. 
Sexuality became the focus of a particular moral frenzy; it is 
here that we approach the more specific forerunners of Freud's ideas. 
The new bourgeois morality stressed frugality, control--of emotion, 
expressiveness, sperm--and discipline, it abhorred "spending" which 
had both a sexual and economic meaning. Stone notes that 
the most valued of Victorian characteristics was respectability, 
which took the form of moral asceticism, buttressed by 
Evangelical piety and reinforced by patriarchy. [He notes, 
further, the prevalence of] ••• reticence, sobriety 
and thrift, punctuality, self-discipline and industry, chastity, 
prudery. • •• [1977, p. 678] 
Sexual "spending" was taken quite literally; quasi-medical 
views were blended together with religious-moral doctrines into a 
conception of "energy"-sexual. vital, or experiential. A man had 
only so much of this vital energy and too much sexual activity could 
drain it away. As Barker-Benfield notes in his aptly titled "The 
Spermatic Economy: a nineteenth-century view of sexuality" (1978) 
there was a widespread belief in pangenesis; each part of the body was 
thought to contribute a fraction of itself to sperm by way of the 
blood. This idea was buttressed by Lamarck's now discredited theory 
of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, a theory that Freud 
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himself never quite gave up. "Energy" was used in the broadest sense: 
"vigor," "vitality," "vital powers," the "moving active spirit" of 
male accomplishment. And doctors, moral experts, and religious 
leaders all agreed that this energy shoul not be "spent" in sex if men 
were to pursue their rightful goals: success, the conquest of nature 
and the making of money. 
Masturbation was a special danger; nineteenth-century 
attitudes and practices about it are among the more bizarre creations 
of the male mind. (See Comfort 1967; Hare 1962; and Spitz 1953 for 
reviews.) Masturbation was widely believed to cause most forms of 
mental disturbance--melancholia, hysteria, neurasthenia, delusions, 
hallucinations, suicide and insanity--and a good number of physical 
diseases as well--epilepsy, memory loss, feeble-mindedness, 
exhaustion, poor vision. The medical and quasi-medical literature was 
filled with advice on how to break children of this dangerous habit; 
threats of castration were common as were various mechanical devices 
that tied down the hands or made touching the genitals painful. In 
extreme cases, circumcision and even clitorectomy and castration were 
recommended. One had to guard against a variety of temptations: 
reading poetry, staying in bed too long in the morning, lounging 
about, bad posture, or too much contact with women on things deemed 
feminine. All these could lure one into the evil habit that "spent" 
the vital-sexual energy. Some typical examples follow. 
Smith-Rosenberg (1972) describes nineteenth-century views on 
the hysterical women 
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Hysteria could also result from a secret and less forgivable form 
of sexuality. Throughout the nineteenth-century physicians 
believed that masturbation was widespread among America's females 
and a frequent cause of hysteria and insanity •••• Masturbation 
was only one form of sexual indulgence. A number of doctors saw 
hysteria among lower class women as originating in the sensuality 
believed to characterize their class (670-671). 
Masturbation had an ever-present potential to drain away a 
person's vital energies. Baker-Benfield quotes Brigham, an American 
authority writing before 1850, on the 
fundamental law of the distribution of vital powers • • • that 
when they are increased in one part, they are diminished in all 
the rest of the living economy to increase the powers of 
one organ it is absolutely necessary that they should be 
diminished in all the others (1978, p. 375). 
Both masturbation and woman had a special attractive power 
that men were cautioned against. An aroused woman's mind was easily 
dominated by her sexual organs. As Barker-Benfield notes 
All women were potentially antagonistic to the fundamental value 
scheme of society. Female masturbation was universally attacked 
on the grounds that it raised women to a state of sexual craving, 
that is, it made her a threat to men (p. 384). 
These views were part of the more encompassing ideas about 
energy-economics 
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The discharge of sperm, it was generally believed, "obliterated," 
"prostrated," and "blotted out" all of "the energies of the 
system." Instead of "concentrating" those energies onto the 
nonsexual end of success, the masturbator concentrated what was 
left of them onto his penis and testicles. "All the remaining 
energies of animal life seem to be concentrated in these organs, 
and all the remaining power to gratification left is in the 
exercise of this • • • loathsome and beastly habit. [The quotes 
are from a Boston physician writing in 1835, p. 377.1 
The historians I have been citing draw on American and English 
sources though they note that European experts shared the same views. 
One of the most widely read "experts" in German was Doctor Daniel G. 
M. Schreber, father of Daniel Paul Schreber, the subject of Freud's 
famous study of paranoia. Doctor Schreber's views on the horrors of 
masturbation-he, like many others, referred to emissions of semen as 
"pollutions"-his recommendation of harsh discipline in infancy, and 
his fanatical stress on control of emotion, the body and all its 
functions, displays all the repressive features of his English-
speaking contemporaries. (See Schatzman, 1973, Breger, 1978.) I 
think it safe to conclude that this interlocking set of "moral" 
beliefs, including the specific ideas about the economics of vital-
sexual energy--were diffused throughout the social world in which 
Freud grew up. Not everyone lived in accord with them, to be sure, 
but they defined the ways in which most aspiring bourgeois citizens 
felt they should live. 
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It is probably hard for the reader today to appreciate the 
pervasiveness and hold of these ideas. They dominated Western views 
of sexuality, pleasure, women and discipline for one hundred years or 
more; they permeated literature, particularly children's literature, 
and were backed by the authority, not only of religious leaders and 
secular "experts," but by the most prominent medical and scientific 
men of the times. And these included Freud's teachers and mentors. 
V. FREUD'S "BIOLOGICAL" FANTASY LIFE 
It is one of my central theses that Freud was deeply 
influenced by this system of beliefs and that its values and specific 
images shaped one line of his ideas about sexuality, mascu1inity-
femininity and the nature of instinct. This is the line found in the 
metaphors of libido, the pleasure principle and the metapsycho10gy. 
The other line is the more popularly known; it is the trend associated 
with the liberation of sexuality from repression and guilt. While 
this second line defines the mainstream of psychoanalysis, the first 
remains alive, albeit in disguised form. 
Freud's letters to Wilhelm Fliess during the years 1887-1902 
give us a unique glimpse of psychoanalytic theory in the process of 
creation. Most of the great discoveries are there in one form or 
another, along with many false starts and mistaken guesses. A central 
idea, and one retained to the end, of course, concerned the connection 
of sexuality and neurosis. But how were they connected? The Fliess 
letters show that certain of Freud's earliest ideas did not differ in 
their basic outline from the views of other nineteenth-century moral 
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and medical experts. In 1893 he asserts that 
Neurasthenia in males is acquired at the age of puberty and 
becomes manifest in the patient's twenties. Its source is 
masturbation, the frequency of which runs completely parallel 
with the frequency of neurasthenia in men. [All quotations are 
from the Fliess correspondence, Freud, 1954, p. 68.] 
Earlier in this same draft he speaks of "early sexual exhaustion" and, 
before beginning a discussion of "abnormal sexual life," cautions 
Fliess: "you will of course keep the draft away from your young wife" 
(p. 66). 
There is much speculation in these early letters about "sexual 
noxae," abstinence, coitus interruptus, too much, too little or the 
wrong kind of sexual release, all of which are thought to produce 
anxiety, depression, neurasthenia, or other symptoms. These views 
seem to be mainly an attempt at a "scientific" version of bourgeois 
morality. They do not differ from those of the mid-nineteenth century 
physician William Acton--an influential authority--who felt that any 
form of sex outside of marriage was dangerous and that, within 
marriage, intercourse should be limited to no more than once every 
seven to ten days least the husband's vital energies be impaired. In 
a letter of 1893 Freud states "I have come to the opinion that anxiety 
is to be connected, not with a mental, but with a physical consequence 
of sexual abuse." A footnote refers to his 1895 paper on anxiety 
neurosis in which he writes: 
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In the first place it was surmised that we are here dealing with 
an accumulation of excitation; secondly, that there was the 
exceedingly important fact the anxiety, which underlies all the 
clinical symptoms of this neurosis, is not derived from any 
psychical source (p. 80). 
Note how the "sexual abuse" of the letter is now the more 
scientific sounding "excitation" in the published paper, a 
transformation that will become increasingly frequent. In a draft of 
1894 he blends together ideas about sexual energy with "the theory of 
constancy," the hypothesis that the nervous system is governed by the 
tendency to seek a constant state through the discharge of excitation 
or energy. Freud's earlier training in physicalist-neurology had left 
a strong commitment to this idea and it persisted to the end of his 
work, undergoing various transformations. In one form it appears as 
the pleasure principle and in another as the death instinct. Here is 
how the cons,tancy principle was linked to sexuality and neurosis in 
1894 
D. Points of Contact with the Theory of Constancy 
Internal and external increase of stimulus: constant and 
ephemeral excitation,--summation a characteristic of internal 
excitation. Specific reactions. -- Formulation and elaboration of 
the theory of constancy--the part played by the ego in the 
storing-up of excitation. 
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E. The Sexual Process in the Light of the Theory of Constancy. 
Path taken by the excitation in the male and female sexual 
processes. Path taken by the excitation under the influence 
of aetiologically operative sexual noxae. -- Theory of sexual 
substance. • • • 
F. Mechanism of the Neuroses 
The neuroses as disturbances of equilibrium due to increased 
difficulty in discharge ••• (pp. 87-88). 
We see, in this draft, the way Freud is beginning to mix 
together nineteenth-century moral ideas about vital-sexual energy 
whose "discharge" must be carefully managed (the metaphor here is 
clearly the discharge of sperm in ejaculation, the "sexual 
substance"), with a theory about the "discharge" of neural excitation. 
The next draft speculates about sources of anxiety in "coitus 
interruptus," "virginal subjects." the "deliberately abstinent," men 
who "force themselves to carry out intercourse though it is beyond 
their desire or strength," in sum, as he puts it, " ••• we are 
dealing with • • • an accumulation of physical sexual tension. The 
accumulation is due to discharge being held up. Anxiety neurosis is 
thus, like hysteria. a neurosis due to dammed-up excitation" (p. 90). 
Other neuroses are similarly explained. In 1895 he speculates 
that "melancholia can arise as an intensification of neurasthenia as a 
result of masturbation." And, later "thus in melancholia there is 
probably a question of 10ss--a loss in the subject's instinctual life 
••• Melancholia consists in mourning over loss of libido,,5 (p. 103). 
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And, in a later draft that same year: "migraine represents a toxic 
effect produced by the stimulus of the sexual substance when this 
cannot find adequate discharge" (p. 117). 
These quotations should be sufficient to show that one line of 
Freud's thinking on the role of sexuality in neurosis was a direct 
continuation of widespread nineteenth-century ideas. In some 
instances his hypotheses are the same as those. of earlier moral-
medical experts, for instance his views on the damaging effects of 
masturbation. At other times he tries to do more; many of his 
hypotheses are attempts to relate specific neurotic conditions to 
specific forms of sexual discharge. In other words, he doesn't assume 
that all sex drains one's vital powers; though some can, one can also 
suffer from insufficient "discharge" or a "damming up" of "sexual 
substance." While his ideas are more complex than earlier theories 
they nevertheless rest on the same view of a dangerous, threatening 
sexual energy whose expression must be carefully managed least 
anxiety, depression or sickness result. 
There is, of course, another line of theory alive in the 
Fliess correspondence, the line that develops into what most would 
agree are Freud's principal contributions; the psychoanalytic theory 
of neurosis and the concepts of repression, resistance and defense; 
many ideas about the unconscious, and the symbolic expression of 
unresolved conflicts. The correspondence is also a partial record of 
Freud's self-analysis with Fliess as unwitting transference figure. 
All these different trends coexist. While the passages I have quoted 
are fairly direct expressions of conventional sexual prejudice, in 
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other places the writing has a tentative character as Freud moves from 
old to new positions. Much of what he says about sexual conflict 
during these years can be seen as aligned with conventional sexual 
views 2£ as part of his new, critical psychoanalytic perspective. 
Here is a passage from his 1898 paper "Sexuality in the Aetiology of 
the Neuroses" which shows the coexistence of both lines of thought: 
Masturbation is far commoner among grown-up girls and mature men 
than is generally supposed, and it has a harmful effect not only 
by producing neurasthenic symptoms, but also because it keeps 
patients under the weight of what they feel to be a disgraceful 
secret. • •• If physicians knew that all the while the patient 
was struggling against his sexual habit and that he was in 
despair because he had once more been obliged to give way to it, 
if they understood how to win his secret from him, to make it 
less serious in his eyes and to support him in his fight against 
the habit, then the success of their therapeutic efforts might in 
this way well be assured. 
We see the persisting assumption that masturbation produces 
symptoms, but also the emergence of another view, that it is not the 
physically dammed up sex but the meaning of sexual activity--the 
feeling that it is "a disgraceful secret"--that causes the 
disturbance. Within this new framework, the physician's task is, in 
part, to alleviate guilt, to, "make it less serious in his eyes." In 
other words, we see the beginnings of what will become the main line 
of psychoanalytic thinking and therapy, a line that Freud vigorously 
I 
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pursues in the next few years in such works as The Interpretation of 
Dreams (1900), The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901), and Jokes 
and Their Relation ~ the Unconscious (1905). The expression of the 
old "moral" prejudice fades in these works based on the self-analysis, 
dreams, the direct observation of cases, slips of the tongue and 
jokes. Yet, there are remnants. The theory of anxiety remains 
unclear for many years; as late as An Autobiographical Study of 1925 
he still speaks of "actual neurosis" in which anxiety presumably 
results from the direct conversion of sexual excitation (no such case 
is ever described), and a final clarification is not accomplished 
until 1926 with the publication of Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. 
Freud's views on women also reveal the lingering effects of 
nineteenth-century beliefs. Women are thought to have weaker super-
egos than men; they are viewed as more corruptible by passion and 
instinct. Thus, in the 1915 "Observations on Transference Love" he 
speaks of "Women of elemental passionateness who tolerate no 
surrogates. They are children of nature who refuse to accept the 
psychical in place of the material ••• • " [pp. 166-1671. And, in 
Civilization and ll! Discontents he describes how 
Women soon come into opposition to civilization and display their 
retarding and restraining influence--those very women who in the 
beginning, laid the foundations of civilization by the claims of 
their love. Women represent the interests of the family and of 
sexual life. [1930, p. 103-41 
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These passages are not far from that earlier image of Woman as 
sexual temptress, luring the male from his rightful, productive work. 6 
These ideas about anxiety and women are remnants, however; 
they are peripheral to the core of psychoanalytic theory based on 
clinical work and direct observation. Freud, after all, opened the 
new profession of psychoanalysis to women at a time when this was 
quite a radical step. And when one reads a late case such as "The 
Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman" (1920) his 
analysis does not rest on any of these outmoded ideas; indeed his 
perception of the effects of prejudice against women in the creation 
of the young patient's disturbance is quite sharp. 
The principal source for the continued expression of the 
values, assumptions and images of Freud's intellectual childhood is in 
what I am calling his "biological fantasy life": the metapsychology. 
libido theory, the economics of pleasure and the permutations of 
instinct. It is here that we find the most pervasive effect of these 
old prejudices, the more powerful because of the indirect or 
metaphorical form in which they are expressed. Thus, while his views 
on women, homosexuality, or variations in sexual practice become 
increasingly free from their "moral" male-centered origins (see the 
very fair-minded discussion of "sexual aberrations" in the first of 
the Three Essays or the Theory of Sexuality for example), the 
metaphorical version of this same prejudice remains unchanged. One 
sees it, for instance, in the pathological power attributed to 
"passive (feminine) libido" or its variants "passivity," "masochism" 
or "latent homosexual impulses" in men. In the case of Schreber 
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(1911) this menacing, "inner," feminine sexuality is seen as root 
cause of a psychotic breakdown (see my 1978 paper for a discussion of 
different interpretations of the Schreber case). 
Let us now turn to two of Freud's key metapsycho10gica1 
papers, On Narcissism: An Introduction (1914) and Instincts and Their 
Vicissitudes (1915), for a more detailed exploration of the way in 
which old assumptions are carried forth in disguised form. One can 
see the persistance of old images clearly in Freud's ideas about the 
economics of love. In On Narcissism he states "We see also, broadly 
speaking, an antithesis between ego-libido and object-libido. The 
more of the one is employed, the more the other becomes depleted" 
(1914, p. 76). In other words, the more you love yourself the less 
love you have for others. This seems a fairly direct transformation 
of the idea, discussed earlier, in which self-love (masturbation) 
depleted one's vital energies leaving none for other activities. And 
it is a direct descendent of a host of ideas on saving and spending 
with which nineteenth-century moralists were preoccupied. Much of the 
theory in the Narcissism and Instincts papers is more complicated than 
this, though at base it rests on the persisting view of a menacing 
sexuality. 
In both essays, Freud begins by outlining a conception of 
instinct in terms of "stimuli," "reflexes," "energy," and "discharge," 
while, at the same time, describing these instincts in a language that 
animates and humanizes them. Thus, in the 1915 paper, the "nervous 
system" has the "task ••• of mastering stimuli" (p. 120); instincts 
"exert pressure" and have "aims" which may be "passive" or "active" 
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(p. 122); and these "aims" are directed to "objects" which may be 
other persons or parts of one's own body (p. 123). In the 1914 paper 
he speaks of "an indifferent psychical energy which only becomes 
libido through the act of cathecting an object" (p. 78). These 
examples may be taken as descriptions of a mechanical system but the 
style--the words and images--leave them open to an anthropomorphic 
interpretation. For it is we humans who have "tasks" to be 
"mastered," whose lives are filled with "aims" and "purposes," who are 
sometimes "active" and at other times "passive," and who seek 
satisfaction in others ("objects") and our own bodies. 
Psychic energy, libido and its various routes to investment 
and discharge are metaphors for human emotional experience, especially 
the experience of sex and love. And the metaphors express, in their 
symbolic way, a conventional set of assumptions. Thus in Instincts 
and Their Vicissitudes Freud speaks of "stimuli" from the "outer 
world" which impinge on "living tissue" which acts to "discharge" such 
stimulation. This describes the relationship between organism and 
reality. "Instincts" are also "stimuli," but they have a different 
origin; instincts are "stimuli to the mind." That is, Freud makes the 
distinction between stimuli which arise outside the organism (reality) 
and those which arise within, equating instincts with this second 
group. Since they arise within us, we cannot escape them. Instinct, 
Never operates as a force giving a momentary impact but 
always as a constant one. Moreover since it impinges not 
from without but from within the organism, no flight can 
avail against it. (S. E., vol. 14, p. 118). 
And later 
It (the organism) will be aware of stimuli which can be 
avoided by muscular action (flight); these it ascribes to 
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an external world. On the other hand, it will also be aware 
of stimuli against which such action is of no avail and whose 
character of constant pressure persists in spite of it; these 
stimuli are the sign of an internal world, the evidence of 
instinctual needs. (p. 119). 
A bit further, Freud restates the basic tendency of the organism 
The nervous system is an apparatus which has the function 
of getting rid of the stimuli that reach it. or of reducing 
them to the lowest possible level; or which. if it were 
feasible. would maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated 
condition. (p. 120) 
These quotations point up certain essential underlying 
assumptions: nature, and our own nature, are both against us. 
"Reality" is pictured as "stimuli" which irritate the organism, who 
attempts to flee from it. Nothing is said about stimuli of an 
inherent attractiveness that the organism is drawn towards. Instinct 
is the inner "reality" and it, too, is an irritant from which one 
seeks escape. (Where are inner sensations of pleasure?) But since it 
is "inside," escape is impossible. Pleasure consists in the absence 
of stimulation. Instinct is a "force" that "impinges • no flight 
can avail against ita" Thus instinct, even more than reality, is an 
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ememy. 
Our instincts--and sex is the main referent here--are against 
us; they disturb our peaceful-pleasureful state and we strive to 
escape them. They arise from our bodies as "stimuli upon the mind"--
irritants--and thus our bodies too are against us. Such "instinctual 
force" is likened to an external reality which, while not as 
persistently irritating, is still a potential disrupter of our 
happiness. Thus, the embattled organism is besieged by hostile forces 
from within his own body and from the outside world; one might almost 
call this a persecutory version of human nature. 
It is worth noting that there is a second line of thought in 
both the Narcissism and Instincts papers. In both essays, the 
meta psychological formulations appear in the beginning and homage is 
paid to physiological reductionism; that is, there are attempts to 
link "libido" with the biological function of sexuality and the hope 
is expressed that some day all will be explained in "scientific," 
terms. But as the essays progress, these trends fade and the main 
focus of Freud's interest becomes clear. On Narcissism is a 
discussion of the course of human love, particularly the complex 
interplay between love of self and love of others. It contains much 
more as well: ideas about schizophrenia, the origins of conscience 
and the development of male and female identity--all topics that 
cannot be reduced to physiological mechanisms or energies. Instincts 
and Their Vicissitudes deals with closely related themes and turns, in 
its later sections, to a discussion of the course of love and hate, 
and the ambivalence characteristic of intense human relationships. If 
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the early version of instinct suggested that a "biological" 
metapsychology, taken literally, was of little use to Freud's central 
concerns, the later sections make clear what these concerns are. And 
they make clear, as well, that the "biological" language is almost 
wholly metaphorical. it is a symbolic representation of human emotion 
and relationship. 
The basic image of "instinct" as an antagonistic force runs 
through the major metapsychological works. It underlies the concept 
of pleasure as getting rid of something: stimulation, excitation, 
sexual substance: (". unpleasure corresponds to an increase in 
the quantity of excitation and pleasure to a diminution," (Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, p. 8). This concept of pleasure as the absence of 
stimulation does not fit most human experience: the pleasure of 
eating when hungry or drinking when thirsty, aesthetic pleasures, the 
joy of exercise and sport, of music amd dance, of humor, or even 
sexual pleasure, all of which involve certain qualities and patterns 
of stimulation rather than their reduction or cessation. (See Klein, 
1976 Chapter 6, and Holt, 1976, for more detailed discussions.) The 
metaphorical power of Freud's idea primarily rests on one aspect of 
male sexuality: ejaculation, yet even there it is not really a matter 
of diminution or conservation but rather a shift from one qualitative 
state to another. The underlying metaphorical power of the pleasure 
principle and related ideas of conservation of libidinal energy 
primarily rests on their expression of nineteenth-century "moral" 
notions of sexual spending and saving. 7 
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The concepts of libido, instinct, energy, discharge, the 
pleasure principle--much of what is termed metapsychology--are often 
viewed as the parts of psychoanalytic theory closest to biology and 
science.8 I think, rather, that they are its most speculative 
aspects, farthest from observations of any kind. These concepts can 
better be thought of as part of Freud's biological fantasy life. In 
the discussion so far, I have stressed the way in which these 
speculative ideas are a return of the repressed, how the metaphors of 
theory give disguised expression to the very nineteenth-century views 
that Freud was moving beyond. But a theoretical fantasy, like a 
dream, is an arena where ideas and assumptions can be expressed in 
fluid and creative ways. The biological fantasies also served Freud 
in a creative fashion; with this set of flexible metaphors he 
experimented with theory as he made the transition from the 
assumptions of his past to new psychoanalytic insights. As an 
illustration consider the following passage from The Ego and the Id: 
It can hardly be doubted that the pleasure principle serves 
the id as a compass in its struggle against the libido -- the 
force that introduces disturbances into the process of life. 
If it is true that Fechner's principle of constancy governs 
life, which thus consists of a continuous descent towards 
death, it is the claims of Eros, of the sexual instincts, 
which, in the form of instinctual needs, hold up the falling 
level and introduce fresh tensions. The id, guided by the 
pleasure principle--that is, by the perception of unpleasure--
fends off these tensions in various ways. It does so in the first 
34 
place by complying as swiftly as possible with the demands of the 
non-desexualized libido--by striving for the satisfaction of 
of the directly sexual trends. But it does so in a far more 
comprehensive fashion in relation to one particular form of 
satisfaction in which all component demands converge--by 
discharge of the sexual substances, which are saturated vehicles, 
so to speak, of the erotic tensions. The ejection of the sexual 
substances in the sexual act corresponds in a sense to the 
separation of soma and germ-plasm. This accounts for the 
likeness of the condition that follows complete sexual satisfaction 
to dying, and for the fact that death coincides with the act of 
copulation in some of the lower animals. These creatures die 
in the act of reproduction because, after Eros has been eliminated 
through the process of satisfaction, the death instinct has a 
free hand for accomplishing its purposes. Finally, as we have 
seen, the ego, by sublimating some of the libido for itself 
and its purposes, assists the id in its work of mastering the 
tensions. (1923, p. 46-47). 
I defy the reader to make sense of this passage as logic or 
reality oriented discourse. "The pleasure principle serves the 
id ••• in its struggle against the libido • •• " but libido is what 
constitutes the id, which is governed by the pleasure principle. And 
then it is "the id" that "fends off" the tensions introduced by Eros, 
which is equated with the sexual instincts. But, isn't the id the 
reservoir of the sexual instincts? And what can "non-desexualized 
libido" be, a direct sexual feeling? Then why the double negative? 
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The four characters in conflict in this passage--the id, Eros, the 
pleasure principle, and sexuality--are never defined independently of 
one another. Indeed, as those familiar with psychoanalytic theory 
will recognize, in other works these terms are defined in 
interchangeable and overlapping ways. There are additional problems 
with the passage: the abrupt switch from a metaphorical to a concrete 
image of sexuality ("discharge of sexual substances"); and the way 
human fantasies that link sexual satisfaction with dying are equated 
with the literal death, in the act of reproduction, of simple 
organisms. Shifting levels of definition, image and referrent occur 
throughout The Ego and The Id, particularly with the concept of 
instinct. One minute it refers to relatively specific actions--
sadism, scoptophilia--and another to the broadest of forces: life and 
death. At some points instinct seems to have an adaptive meaning in 
the Darwinian sense and at others to be non-adaptive, anti-person and 
anti-life. The sexual instinct is at times Eros, associated with a 
binding together, with love and life, and at other times the id, the 
"seething cauldron" of impulses ever threatening to erupt. And, as 
the quotation reveals, sexual discharge can lead to death: those 
"vital powers," again drained away. 
It is difficult to make logical sense of a passage like this 
but, if we treat it as a dream, as a specimen of Freud's biological 
fantasy life, it becomes understandable. He is experimenting with two 
views of sexuality, one associated with threat, tension and death and 
the other with pleasure, love and life. If the quoted passage is read 
in this way, one can see it as part of the continuing movement toward 
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a positive valuation of sexuality, love and feminine-maternal 
qualities that characterizes the larger course of Freud's work. This 
is the direction taken by the late essays, especially the final 
chapters of Civilization and Its Discontents. 
VI Instinct Theory from a Sense of Guilt 
I began this essay by asserting that mind and psychological 
experience are inseparable from the metaphors in which they are represented. 
I .have tried to show that what Freud viewed as the most scientific 
and biological of his theories are, in fact, infused with a set of 
metaphors whose evocative power rests on their connection with 
conventional nineteenth-century ideas about sex, masturbation, the body, 
emotion and women. It is helpful to recall that from the 1890s onward 
Freud's observations were of persons (including himself), fantasies and 
dreams, emotional reactions and relationships. He did not keep up with 
neurology and physiology but much preferred to read Goethe, Shakespeare, 
Dostoevsky, history and anthropology. Thus, while he continued to 
write about the "nervous system" and its "excitations," he actually 
worked with persons, free associations and subjective experience; the 
theory could posit a "depletion of libidinal energy," what was observed 
with sadness and depression; he could speak of "object cathexis," 
"narcissistic libido," or the "eruption of id impulses," what was seen 
was love of others, of oneself and the experience of emotion--sexual, 
aggressive -- as a dangerous inner force. 
Freud used a set of metaphors, adapted from his earlier work 
in biology, and blended with various commonsense and experiential 
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meanings, to conceptualize his new psychoanalytic observations. The 
metaphors express the way sexual feeling, the body, masculinity-
femininity and emotion were experienced by many of Freud's patients 
and contemporaries, no doubt by himself, and by many of us still. 
Most middle-class children in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries were raised in a way that induced a profound belief in the 
scarcity of physical affection and the dangers of sexual stimulation. 
If you were weaned early, shifted back and forth between your mother 
and substitute caretakers, wrapped in swaddling clothes and a 
profusion of other garments, constantly stopped and disciplined when 
"touching yourself," and generally expected to behave like a polite 
little man or woman from the earliest years on, how could you feel 
otherwise about pleasure, emotional expression, sex, or your body? 
Sex was a dangerous inner force that "impinges 
avail against it" and "libido" was scarce. 
no flight can 
Of course, to say that the metapsychology, the theory of 
instinct and libido, do capture certain truths about the way sex was 
experienced is to treat these ideas in a different manner than has 
usually been the case. It is to move from Freud's text itself to an 
interpretation of that text. Such an interpretation stresses that 
these are possible ways of representing sexual experience but not the 
only ways. It also recognizes that this is not a scientific theory 
that links psychoanalysis with neurology or biology despite Freud's 
occasional expression of such hopes. And, finally, it recognizes that 
the metaphors of the theory conceal the lingering presence of old 
prejudices. 
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Since our approach has been "psychoanalytic," that is, since I 
have been treating these theories as analogous with the fantasies of a 
neurosis, it remains to offer some speculations for their persistence 
and continual reemergence. One can point to several "manifest" or 
"conscious" reasons for the persistence of these ideas. Freud was 
trained in a natural science tradition and retained a certain 
allegiance to the beliefs of that tradition. Both the physicalist 
language of libido theory and the return to biological speculations 
reflect the effects of that background. Perhaps of greater 
importance, attempts to link the new field of psychoanalysis with 
science gave it a certain respectability and prestige by association. 
It was hard enough to stand forth as the man who talked about the sex 
life of infants, who took dreams seriously and who probed into areas 
that respectable people would never speak about; at least it could be 
done under the mantle of science. And, finally, there were Freud's 
scientific ambitions; he often puts forth wide-sweeping, "powerful" 
hypotheses: all dreams are wish fulfillments, all anxiety is dammed 
up sexual excitation, one "biological force"--sexuality, libido--is 
the cause of all human action. His discovery of the role of sexuality 
in the neuroses, and his attempt to frame it as a single broad casual 
force--linked up with conventional science through the 
metapsychology--is part of this search for the psychoanalytic laws of 
gravity. 
While all these factors played some part in the persistence of 
conventional metaphors and images they do not, it seems to me, account 
for the hold of these ideas, their failure to change with reality 
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testing--new clinical observations--or the non-logical fluidity with 
which the the theoretical language is used. All these belie an 
additional source of motivation, an unconscious source. 
Using the new method of psychoanalysis, Freud found himself 
confronted with .the painful underside of modern society: the 
exploitation of women; the corruption of love and pleasure; the 
mistreatment of children in the most respectable--the "nicest"-- of 
families; death and loss, so badly mourned, so incompletely dealt 
with; and madness--insanity itself--with its terrifying fears and 
disruptive results. The neurotics he worked with were, in this sense, 
the victims of civilized progress, their unconscious conflicts--and 
his own as he came to see in his self-analysis--contained the symbolic 
record of their victimization. 
Now when one confronts a truth like this, a truth that most 
members of respectable society have a stake in denying, one can adopt 
a revolutionary stance and tell others of the realities they dare not 
face, or one can go along with the prevailing rationalizations. Freud 
does both. On the one hand, he confronts his culture with its own 
denied secrets and develops a method which provides access to the 
disguised, covered-over, or unconscious side of life. And he 
formulates a critical theory about this secret realm: it is driven by 
sexuality--a sexuality in which love has been corrupted by anxiety, 
guilt and painful symptoms. Concurrently, he constructs a scientific 
appearing theory that turns away from painful human experience, from 
socially induced conflict and, in effect, blames all on sex and 
instinct themselves. If there are conflicts in the unconscious, if 
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neurotics suffer disturbances in their sexual lives, it is because 
human instincts are antisocial, selfish and narcissistic. 9 In this 
second view, sexuality becomes a scapegoat, just as women, children, 
and the "feminine" side of men were scapegoats. It is in this way 
that the metaphors of the theory of sexuality are a return of the 
repressed, driven by guilt. While the main force of Freud's work has 
been to liberate us from just this baleful legacy, parts of this 
theory, like the symptoms of a neurosis, perpetuate old conflicts in 
disguised form. As such, they run counter to the essential 
psychoanalytic spirit of inquiry, awareness and insight. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The ideas discussed in this essay are elaborated in a different 
form in my book: Freud's Unfinished Journey: Conventional and 
Critical Perspectives in Psychoanalytic Theory. (London & Boston: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.) I want to thank the following 
friends and colleagues for their comments and criticism of 
an earlier draft of this paper: Stuart Ende, David James 
Fisher, Nancy Hayles, Victoria Hamilton, Herbert Morris, Joseph 
Natterson. Robert Rosenstone. and Randolph Splitter. 
2. In their compendium, The Language of Psychoanalysis, Laplanche 
& Pontalis define libido as: 
Energy postulated by Freud as underlying the transformation 
of the sexual instinct with respect to its object (displacement 
of cathexes). with respect to its aim (e.g. sublimation). 
and with respect to the source of sexual excitation (diversity 
of the erotogenic zones). (1973, p. 239). 
3. Taylor (1954) presents a theory of the oscillations between what 
he terms "patrist" and "matrist" orientations. The patrist is 
politically authoritarian. sexually repressive, gives low status 
to women and things deemed feminine--emotion, expressiveness, 
play, dance--and worships a male or father deity. The matrist 
is the reverse, a female or mother deity is worshipped, there is a 
more open expression of emotion and sexuality and much less control: 
social, religious, or personal. See also his account of English 
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history during the period 1750-1850 (1958). Stone's The Family 
Sex and Marriage (1977) is a recent, well-documented historical 
account, noting the same sort of oscillation. Much evidence on the 
treatment--and mistreatment--of infants and children is 
presented in the volume edited by de Mause (1974) though the reader 
must ignore the hyperbole. See also Barker-Benfield (1978), 
Despert (1965), Hunt (1970) and Schatzman (1973). 
4. One of the origins of Freud's personal feelings of guilt, 
discovered in his self-analysis and reported to Fliess in 1897, 
stemmed from his experience with his nurse" • • • the old 
woman who provided me at such an early age with the means for living 
and surviving. You see how the old liking breaks through again." 
(p. 220). This "shrewd old woman," to whom the young Freud 
was strongly attached, was caught stealing toys and money, fired 
and sent to prison. In the analysis of his dreams Freud discovers 
both the anxiety over the loss of this substitute mother--a 
common event in the days of wet-nurses and other temporary 
caretakers--and his own feelings of guilt arising from an 
identification with her. We see here, just the tip of the iceberg 
of conflict arising from a social system of devalued women, 
substitute mothers, servants seeking revenge through indirect 
means, and related phenomena. It is interesting to reread Freud's 
female cases, from the Studies on Hysteria on, with this set of 
social values in mind. The reactions of servant girls and 
governnesses (Katherine and Lucy R. in The Studies), or daughters 
used in such capacities (Anna O. and Dora), can be related to 
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the frustrations of their devalued social position. 
5. Even as he puts forth this "physical" hypotheses to explain 
depression he does so with words--"loss" "mourning"--that 
foreshadows his later, psychological theory. This later theory 
contains central psychoanalytic insights: the role of loss of 
love, of love objects and blocked mourning in depression. 
6. Though the thrust of Civilization and Its Discontents takes 
a very different direction as I attempt to show in Chapter 6 
of Freud's Unfinished Journey. 
7. A colleague, Nancy Hayles, has pointed out how male sexual 
physiology is the implicit basis for the larger theory of sexuality. 
As she puts it 
The idea that libido is limited in quantity, the emphasis 
on "channels" which can be blocked or free, in fact the whole 
hydrodynamic imagery is directly related to male sexual 
physiology. The "fluid" which can be dammed up or flow 
freely surely has, as one of its metaphorical progenitors, 
seminal emission. Similarly, that there is just so much of 
this fluid, and that if you spend it one way you can't another, 
also relates to the recovery intervals males experience after 
emission. That male sexual response is the model for the 
theory is never explicitly stated, indeed, to state it would 
have been to render the underlying patriarchal assumptions 
conscious and therefore subject to question and scrutiny. 
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But one can appreciate just how formative the male model 
is for the theory by imagining what Freud would have 
postulated had he been a woman. If female physiology had 
had been taken as normative, ~ theory might have posited 
a synergistic rather than conservative model, imagining a flow 
of libido that builds the more it is released. 
8. Freud's own attitude towards his quasi-biological theories is mixed. 
For example, he begins Chapter 4 of Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
by noting 
What follows is speculation, often far-fetched speculation 
which the reader will consider or dismiss according to his 
individual predilection. (p. 24). 
Yet, at other times, he yearns for the certainties and "solid 
ground" of biology. 
9. It is instructive to examine Freud's treatment of pain in Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle in the light of the present interpretation. 
He begins with the familiar physicalistic metaphors 
We have decided to relate pleasure and unpleasure to the 
quantity of excitation that is present in the mind but is 
not in any way 'bound;' and to relate them in such a manner 
that unpleasure corresponds to an increase in the quantity 
of excitation and pleasure to a diminuation. (p. 7-8). 
He then moves "beyond" this pleasure principle with the well-known 
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account of the infant who plays at throwing his toys away and 
retrieving them to master the trauma of his mother's absence. 
Here, the pain is that caused by the loss of a loved and needed 
other person; what will later become the primary anxiety of 
separation. Freud develops further examples of psychological 
pain, describing the repression of infantile sexuality in the 
following terms 
That efflorescence (of childhood sexuality and ambition) 
comes to an end in the most distressing circumstances and 
to the accompaniment of the most painful feelings. Loss 
of love and failure leave behind them a permanent injury 
to self-regard in the form of a narcissistic scar, which 
• • • contributes more than anything to the 'sense of 
inferiority' which is so common in neurotics. (p. 20-21). 
Pain as loss of love, as humiliation, narcissistic injury 
and sense of inferiority, came from the heart of psychoanalytic 
experience and point the way to new insights and discoveries. 
But, in the very next chapter, Freud shifts away from all this 
and puts forth his "biological" hypothesis of the death 
instinct--the tendency to repeat inherent in all organic 
substance--which recasts the repetitions due to painful human 
experiences in impersonal terms. Late in the essay he says: 
"Biology is truly a land of unlimited possibilities." (p. 60). 
Would that it were, though who can blame Freud for taking a 
respite from the painful realities encountered in the unconscious 
in this land of fantasy-theory. 
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